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FOREWORD
The question of democracy in the Middle East has become an issue
of high politics and high policymaking for the U.S. Government. Yet
in the process of rising to such a salient position in the foreign policy
agenda, many of the nuances and complexities that promoting
democracy in the Middle East encounters have received inadequate
analysis.
The central distinction between political liberalization and
democratization is particularly important. Political liberalization
is not a phase in an inevitable transition to democracy in the Arab
world, but rather a hybrid system that blends liberalization and
autocracy. For the United States, a key question it must tackle is
whether it should push Arab regimes to move beyond the boundaries
of liberalized autocracy. The answer is far from obvious, since any
push for substantive democratization could empower Islamists, and/
or re-ignite sectarian, religious, or ideological conﬂict in countries
such as Egypt, Morocco, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, or Yemen.
This monograph, by Dr. Daniel Brumberg, is an important
contribution to the public debate on these vital issues.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph looks at the political origins and dynamics of
“liberalized autocracy” in the Arab world. Liberalized autocracy is
a system of rule that allows for a measure of political openess and
competition in the electoral, party, and press arenas, while ultimately
ensuring that power rests in the hands of ruling regimes. This mix
of control and openness has not only beneﬁtted ruling elites, but
oppositons as well. It gives them room to “let off steam,” to criticize
regimes, and occasionally to affect public policy. Moreover, given
the absence of consensus in many Arab states over national identity,
liberalized autocracy has provided an umbrella by which competing
groups―Islamists, secularists, Kurds, and Berbers―can achieve a
measure of peaceful coexistence precisely because no group actually
wields power. The United States largely has supported such hybrid
systems, a fact of political life that has not changed dramatically
under the Bush administration despite its rhetorical commitment to
democracy. Whether the gap between words and deeds should or
can be closed or narrowed is a complex question, since a sudden
move from state managed liberalization to democracy could open
the door to Islamist power.
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DEMOCRATIZATION VERSUS
LIBERALIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD:
DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR U.S FOREIGN POLICY
Introduction: Between Philosophy and Policy.
In his November 6, 2003, speech before the National Endowment
for Democracy, President Bush laid out an ambitious vision for a
“forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.” While some
observers attributed the speech to the White House’s desire to
redeﬁne the very purpose of the Iraq war, the fact of the matter is
the administration’s neo-conservatives long have argued that the
toppling of Saddam Hussein was the ﬁrst shot in a long campaign
to democratize the Middle East. Bush’s speech clearly showed that
the President has fully embraced the neo-conservatives’ conviction
that it is the “calling” of the United States (as he put it), to extend the
global democratic revolution to the Middle East.
Will such idealism withstand the test of time and circumstance?
Thus far, the administration has adopted a philosophy rather than a
strategy, an aspiration rather than a coherent plan. As a result, it has
been operating on a kind of default policy mechanism, whose main
outlines defer to the “liberalization strategy” that has guided the
Middle East democracy aid programs of the United States for nearly
a decade. That strategy calls for reinforcing civil society organizations
in the hope that they eventually will push ruling elites to move
beyond state-managed political liberalization strategies―strategies
that Arab elites have used to avoid the challenges of democratization.
This “demand side” approach has been welcomed by the rulers of
what I call “liberalized autocracies” for obvious reasons: Insofar as
the rulers of Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Yemen
depend on a certain measure of state managed pluralism to maintain
their rule, American aid programs that encourage a gradual
opening up and pluralizing of civil society are, by design or default,
consonant with the regime survival strategies of Arab rulers. Thus
the obvious questions that are central to this monograph: Can or
should the United States encourage Arab leaders to move beyond
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the conﬁnes of state enforced pluralism? Can political liberalization
be transformed into a handmaiden of democratization rather than
an adjunct of liberalized autocracy?
As we shall see, the answers are far from clear or obvious. To
move beyond the piecemeal liberalization approach that has long
guided our Middle East democracy aid programs, the United
States must reinforce its traditional “demand side” civil society
policies with a “supply side” focus that tackles the key problem: the
institutions and ruling ideologies of Arab states. Such a shift will be
very difﬁcult, since it will require pressuring some of the very Arab
leaders whose support on the war on terrorism the administration
needs. Moreover, inasmuch as a state-focused, supply side approach
could open the door to Islamist political power, the United States
will have to carefully assess where and when a democratization
strategy is least likely to create a zero-sum conﬂict between Islamist
oppositions and the state. Since such a conﬂict beneﬁts only two
players―Islamists and regime hard-liners―the most likely candidates
for a successful democratization strategy will be those whose party
systems already boast a level of ideological pluralism sufﬁcient to
contain the challenge of Islamist parties. For reasons I will explain
below, I believe that Morocco is one of the few countries in the Arab
world where the risks of a full blown democratization strategy might
be worth taking.
Finally, I should state for the record that as far as I am concerned,
no serious democratization strategy has the slightest chance of
success so long as the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict continues to simmer
and periodically blow up. Unless the administration shows in words
and, most important, in deeds that it believes that the Palestinians
are as deserving of independence and democracy as are the Iraqis,
all the talk of democratization in the Arab world will ring hollow in
the minds of a vast majority of Arab youth.
The “Democracy Gap.”
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the democracy gap in the Middle
East has become a focus of public debate in the United States and of
high policy in the Bush administration itself. But for those who have
long studied the region or the wider problem of democratization,
2

the subject is not new. For a decade Freedom House’s annual
reports have chartered the nondemocratic nature of Middle East
regimes along two axes: political rights and civil liberties. Year
after year, the region has come up short, not only by comparison
to the industrialized West but, more importantly, by comparison to
other Third World states that have signiﬁcant Muslims pluralities
(such as India) or majorities, such as Indonesia. Thus the Middle
East, and the Arab world in particular, has proven one of the most
democracy resistant regions of the world. Yet these same ﬁgures
also suggest, albeit in inadequate ways, some interesting nuances.1
Six Middle East states―Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen―score worse along the political
rights axis than they do along the civil liberties axis. In other words,
while there is a general shortage of formal democracy, a few of the
region’s autocracies tolerate varying degrees of political pluralism
and openness. Freedom House’s “partly free” category―which is
assigned to Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Turkey―gets
at this interesting nuance. But it fails to fully capture the number
of Arab regimes whose endurance can be explained in part by a
heritage of political eclecticism. For this reason, Table 1 includes a
“regime type” category that puts the region in a different light. As
the table indicates, only a minority of Middle East regimes (seven,
including Iran and the former Iraq) can be called “full autocracies,”
by which I mean regimes that tolerate no dissent and permit not
a shred of independent democratic practice. The vast majority are
partial autocracies, or what I call “liberalized autocracies.” Unlike
full autocracies, whose survival depends on quashing all political
competition, the very endurance of liberalized autocracies depends
on acquiescing to, or even promoting, a measure of state managed
political openness.
The Logic of Liberalized Autocracy.
Liberalized autocracies are not unique to the Middle East. Semiautocracies of one kind or another dot the globe, a tribute to the fact that
the so-called “global democratic revolution” was less a consequence
of some kind of Hegelian dialectic by which the democratic idea
magically conquered the world, as it was a consequence of the
political and economic failure of full autocracies.
3

Country
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Yemen

FH 1993 Rankings (PR, CL*)
6,5 Not Free
5,5 Partly Free (6,5 2002)
6,6 Not Free
6,6 Not Free
7,7 Not Free
6,5 Partly Free (5,5 2002)
4,5 Partly Free
6,5 Not Free
7,7 Not Free
5,5 Partly Free
6,5 Not Free
6,6 Not Free
7,7 Not Free
7,7 Not Free
7,7 Not Free
3,4 Partly Free
6,5 Not Free
6,5 Not Free (6,6 2002)

Regime Type
Partial Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Towards Full Autocracy?
Collapsed Full Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Full Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Full Autocracy
Full Autocracy
Full Autocracy
Illiberal Democracy
Full Autocracy
Partial Autocracy

Note: Best rating is 1, worst rating is 7. (*PR- political rights,
CL- civil liberties)
Table 1. Muslim Majority Middle East States.
But if what scholars of modern Russia call “managed pluralism” has
its analogues in the Arab world, the region’s liberalized autocracies
have ideological, social, political, and institutional traits speciﬁc to
the region.2 The distinctive quality of liberalized autocracies creates
a complex challenge for any serious Middle East democratization
strategy.
Like all semi-authoritarian political systems, those in the Middle
East rely on a complex system of opening and closing, loosening and
tightening, whose vague contours are designed to keep opposition
forces off balance. State-managed control of elections, political
parties, the “opposition press,” and civil society institutions creates
a safety valve that gives opposition forces a means to release steam
while enhancing the capacities of regimes to divide the opposition,
and to gather useful information on the nature and scope of their
opponents. As the late Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat once
put it, “democracy is a safety valve so I know what my enemies are
doing.”
4

But it would be a mistake to see liberalized autocracy as merely
a regime survival tactic. Instead, it is an integrated system whose
internal rules and logic not only serve the interests of rulers, but also
those of many (but not all) mainstream opposition elites. Although
these elites often complain about the limits placed by the state on
democratic expression, the din of their criticism often masks a rough
consensus regarding the preferability of liberalized autocracy over
the black hole of full or rapid democratization.
The roots of this rough consensus can be traced to a legacy of
political development in the Arab world that is some 4 decades old.
First, the region suffers from an enduring heritage of depoliticization.
Political life has been dominated by elites who operate through
patron-client networks or formal corporatist channels. Most of the
public has been left out of the equation, thus creating a sense of the
remoteness of national politics itself. Formal institutions such as
parties have provided a shell through which elites vied for power
but rarely mobilized the wider population. In “populist” regimes,
ruling parties such as Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union
never secured a grass roots following comparable to Indonesia’s
Golkar Party or Mexico’s Institutionalized Revolutionary Parties. As
for the political parties of Arab monarchies, in a few cases, such as
Morocco, political parties managed to sink some roots in society. But
in the vast majority of cases, they are either illegal (as in Bahrain
and Kuwait) and/or consist of informal groupings or factions led by
notables that have informal ties to one or another faction of the ruling
family.3 Second, this process of depoliticization was buttressed by a
“ruling bargain” by which the state promised jobs, social welfare,
and security in return for the political quiescence of the wider
population. Whether funded by oil rents, import substitution, and
quasi-socialist public sectors, or by strategic grants and loans from
the Superpowers (sometimes it was a combination of all three, as
in Egypt), this bargain gave rulers a means to skirt the taxation/
representation nexus that helped foster democracy in the West4.
Third, precisely because most Arab rulers preferred patronage over
brute force and co-optation over prisons or executions, they could
develop an efﬁcient military-security apparatus whose deadly claws
were usually reserved for those who challenged the very foundations
of the political system. Eschewing pure despotism, most Arab leaders
5

accommodated a range of ethnic, social, and religious groups, thus
creating a level of incipient, if unruly, pluralism. Paradoxically, it
is precisely this level of pluralism that abets the regime “survival
strategies” of liberalized autocracies. By playing one group against
the other, they divide their opponents, thus enhancing the regime’s
room for maneuver and autonomy from any one group.5 Finally,
Arab rulers attempted to legitimate this live-and-let-live system
by disseminating a communal or patrimonialist vision of authority
that, even in its most “secular” version, relied implicitly on Islamic
symbols to buttress the ultimate authority of the king or president.
During the 1980s, this merging of elite politics, patronage,
selective repression, and patrimonialism came under pressure as the
rents that had funded the “ruling bargain” declined. But this decline
was never decisive enough to create a systemic crisis of sufﬁcient
severity to either topple regimes or to compel reformists and
opponents to negotiate a new democratic bargain. Instead, the old
bargain and its institutions were reworked and revised to create the
foundations for today’s liberalized autocracies. In countries ruled by
single parties, such as Egypt and Tunisia, this dynamic began when
“reformers” such as Sadat or Tunisia’s Ben Ali literally invented
opposition “platforms” (munabir) or formal parties. Because the
leaders of these parties usually came from one faction or another of
the ruling establishment, the liberalization of party life did not create
parties with grass roots constituencies. Instead, it largely maintained
the personal or familial networks that had long sustained traditional
elite structures and that assured support within both regimes and
oppositions for state-managed liberalization. As for the monarchies
of Morocco, Jordan, and to some extent Kuwait, while they did not
boast the ruling parties of their populist cousins, the close links
between “opposition” party leaders and the king nevertheless
ensured what was often a remarkable level of consensus. Moreover,
given the lack of organic links between opposition parties and the
wider populace in both populist regimes and monarchies, there was
little basis upon which to mobilize a popular movement in favor of
reforms that would challenge the basic rules of the game.
Still, this opposition-regime elite consensus came with a price:
the opening of the legislative systems to a degree of competition
sufﬁcient to give opposition elites some voice but insufﬁcient to give
6

them the institutional means (or authority) to overcome the ultimate
power of the executive. The latter’s dominance almost always is
enshrined in the constitutions of the Arab world, which either
explicitly give the monarch or president ultimate authority (as is the
case in Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen), or implicitly do the same by
not providing a decisive separation of powers that makes it possible
for elected assemblies to represent the will of elected majorities.
During the early and mid-1990s, this arrangement invited periodic
conﬂicts between legislatures and executives on a range of issues
such as party and press laws. But no mainstream opposition parties
questioned the basic rules of the game that animated liberalized
autocracies. At worst, legislative-executive conﬂicts sometimes
compelled leaders to dissolve parliaments, as was the case in Jordan
in 2001, or to force the resignation of an existing cabinet, as was
the case in Kuwait in 2002.6 At best, clever executives initiated new
“reforms” whose paradoxical consequence was to partly strengthen
the executive. This was often accomplished by creating an upper
house whose appointed or indirectly elected members have the
authority to block the legislation of the lower house and thus can
effectively defend the supremacy of the executive. Such was the case
with Morocco’s constitutional reforms in 1996, with those of Algeria
in 1996, and those of Bahrain in 2002.
Why do opposition forces tolerate or even embrace such regimefriendly constitutional reforms? One reason is that while such changes
do not radically alter the balance of power between executives and
legislatures, they still give opposition parties a chance to get in the
game, or to build support among a wary and often distant public. In
Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen, reforms at different times have made it
possible for opposition parties to participate in multi-party cabinets,
and in Morocco, to form a government that during the mid-1990s
was led by the opposition. But since such cabinets do not wield
ultimate authority, this only begs the question: Why participate in
governments that at the end of the day, do not actually rule?
One answer lies in the fact that state managed power
sharing arrangements can create space for social and ideological
accommodations that would be difﬁcult to sustain in more traditional
win/lose democratic systems. Many Middle East states remain
divided by sharp ethnic, religious, cultural, or ideological cleavages.
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Because the most transparent and democratic of elections can make
it possible for victors to use their mandate to disenfranchise their
opponents, win/lose democracy often invites rather than diminishes
conﬂicts over national identity (a point that the Bush administration
is now learning in Iraq). Algeria’s aborted election in 1992 was a case
in point. There a host of groups―labor, women’s organizations, many
Berbers, and elements within the secular intelligentsia―supported
or acquiesced to the military’s halting of a second round of elections
that would have brought the Islamic Salvation Front to power.7 While
the 8-year civil war that ensued showed that the total exclusion of
Islamists from politics was a recipe for further bloodshed, Algeria’s
experience also illustrated the dangers of jumping head-long into
a win/lose democratic system absent some minimal consensus
over national identity. Thus, beginning in 1997, the regime and
opposition parties adopted a system by which Islamists, liberal
secularists, ethnic Berbers, and state apparatchiks shared seats in a
parliament. While the latter had no real power, under its roof an
aura of peaceful coexistence between different parties and identities
emerged precisely because none of the parties could impose its vision
of political community through the largely powerless legislature.8
Algeria may be the most dysfunctional example of liberalized
autocracy, but it is hardly unique. In far away Kuwait, secularists
and Islamists since 1992 have sat in a parliament that is probably
the most vocal and obstructionist institution of its kind in the Arab
world. While secular and Islamist parliamentarians occasionally
have joined forces on issues such as foreign investment, none have
challenged the complex set of formal and informal mechanisms
that allow the royal family to prevent any one faction from actually
controlling the parliament―or using an election victory to impose
its cultural or social agenda on the rest of society. Since Kuwait’s
relatively open society gives Islamists and secularists opportunities
to express themselves in parliament and in a variety of newspapers
and civil society institutions, but also boasts a political system that
makes it difﬁcult for any faction to impose its agenda on other
groups “democratically,” there remains a high degree of consensus
regarding the desirability of maintaining the status quo rather than
moving to full democracy.
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During the 1990s, the proliferation of civil society organizations
in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Kuwait greased the wheels
of liberalized autocracy. Unable to cope with the manifold social,
economic, and humanitarian challenges facing the state, governments
let nongovernmental or quasi-nongovernmental groups initiate
programs in health, the environment, and education. Longstanding professional associations representing lawyers, journalists,
businessmen, academics, doctors, and engineers also became more
active and politicized as they attempted to become substitutes for
ossiﬁed political parties. This dynamic served the interest of regimes
whose very divide and rule strategies beneﬁted from the fragmented
nature of civil society. Yet given the absence of alternative avenues
of mobilization, civil society activists embraced the opportunities
that came their way, even as they occasionally challenged or deﬁed
the legal and constitutional restraints used by the state to limit their
activities. As in the arenas of political party and parliamentary
life, civil society activism helped to sustain liberalized autocracies
because it offered advantages to both opposition and ruling elites.9
Islamists and the Limits of Liberalized Autocracy.
Given the durability and partial legitimacy of liberalized
autocracies, it might be argued that what works should not be ﬁxed.
But semi-authoritarianism comes with a huge price tag, not only for
Arab societies but also for the United States. The most glaring cost is
this: The very success of liberalized autocracy can make a transition
to democracy difﬁcult. Rather than open the door to a transition,
state managed liberalization in the Arab world tends to close this
door, or at least block its way. Why is this so?
To begin with, because of constitutional restraints placed on
party and parliamentary life, political parties are often deprived of
the opportunity to practice the arts of representation, mobilization,
and compromise, all of which are vital to functioning political
parties. Indeed, as the experience of Morocco, Egypt, and especially
Algeria demonstrates, over time parties that play the liberalization
game can loose legitimacy precisely because they participate in a
system which the society views as bogus, illegitimate, or irrelevant.
Civil society organizations may have grown in number, but, in
9

their present conﬁguration, most do little to resolve this problem.
Indeed, their political activism carries with it a double cost: On the
one hand, it often undermines their capacity to defend their speciﬁc
professional interests, while on the other, it does little to bolster
speciﬁcally political organizations such as parties or parliaments.
Most civil society organizations cannot substitute for either, and
thus cannot compensate for the essential weakness of political society,
by which I mean a coherent set of institutions whose speciﬁc role
is to mobilize and represent competing interests of the populace.
Finally, it should be noted that the economic development strategies
of liberalized autocracies have not created the social foundations
for more robust representational politics. On the contrary, because
their endurance hinges on tolerating a variety of public and private
sector economic actors (and manipulating them in ways that sustain
the regime’s maneuverability), most liberalized autocracies have
skirted the tough political choices involved in promoting genuine
market reforms. Relying on rents of one kind or another, many have
depended on a muddling through strategy in both the economic and
political realms.
Islamists have often been the most vociferous critics of such
muddling through strategies. They have assailed vigorously the
repercussions of trying to integrate Arab states into a globalizing
system, whose economic and especially cultural underpinnings are
said to be alien to “Muslim” values. But despite or perhaps because of
these critiques (which enhances their social standing among the urban
poor), Islamists have been the primary beneﬁciaries of liberalized
autocracy. It is not simply a matter of their control of mosques and
charitable institutions. The essential issue is that this control gives
Islamists a capacity to mobilize and thus emerge as the only true
representative nonstate institutions, by which I mean those that have
organic and organized links to society itself. Paradoxically, though,
this privileged position owes much to the Islamists’ long-standing
and sometimes cozy relationship with certain segments of the ruling
elite or party, a fact of life in Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, and even Egypt.
Thus, for example, while Mubarak’s government periodically has
repressed radical Islamists, it has not only given a fairly wide berth to
mainstream fundamentalists by ceding control to them of Al-Azhar
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University, it has also tolerated and thus effectively condoned the
courts’ periodic persecution of reformist Islamist thinkers such as
Cairo University’s Dr. Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid.10
This advantageous combination of being outside and inside the
state helped Islamists make substantial gains in elections during the
early and mid-1990s, a development that often threatened to overturn
or destabilize the delicate balancing act that liberalized autocracies
counted on for their survival. As a result, a pattern of opening and
closing, liberalization and deliberalization, emerged in many Arab
states. In Yemen the ruling General Popular Congress (GDP) ﬁrst
relied on its alliance with the Islah Party to neutralize the secular
Yemeni Socialist Party, but then used machine politics and physical
intimidation during the 1997 elections to reduce dramatically Islah’s
seats in the parliament.11 In Jordan, King Hussein rewrote the
election laws to create constituencies that favored tribal over Islamist
identities, then passed a new press law that increased the state’s
power to censor journalists arbitrarily. His son, King Abdullah, went
even further in 2001, when he dissolved parliament and ruled by
decree for a 2-year period during which elections were postponed
twice. A similar pattern thus far has not emerged in Morocco, where
the two mainstream nationalist parties so far have retained enough
support to limit the gains of the Justice and Development Party (JDP).
But this situation may only be temporary. Knowing full well that
any sweeping victory might antagonize the authorities, during the
2002 parliamentary elections the JDP chose not to run a full slate of
candidates. In the wake of the elections, the JDP emerged as the third
largest party in parliament―a politically comfortable position that
enhanced its credibility among its followers, while reassuring the
king and his allies in the secular parties and security apparatus that
they still called the shots. In short, far from encouraging a regimeopposition dialogue on how best to move beyond limits of state
managed pluralism, liberalized autocracy often promotes a zerosum, state versus society stand-off that, from the vantage point of
the regime, raises the risk of genuine democratization. The resulting
retreat by the state saps the regime of legitimacy, thus guaranteeing
the day when a new leader emerges to declare a reopening of the
system, a new day of dialogue and trust that eventually gives way to
apathy and/or disillusionment.
11

The costs of this destabilizing cycle for Arab leaders has been high.
It has widened the gulf between rulers and populace, while hindering
the creation of modern political institutions that can galvanize the
public. Because renewing this system hinges on securing a new
leader―a King Abdullah in Jordan, a King Mohammed in Morocco
(or perhaps, a new King/President Gamal Mubarak in Egypt)―
liberalized autocracy rests on the potentially unstable foundations
of individual personality. This fact is of utmost importance to the
United States since the vast majority of our friends in the Arab world
preside over liberalized autocracies. The United States has hitched
its wagon to a political system that appears capable of survival, but
not of much dramatic economic or political change, and which thus
remains vulnerable to internal and external shocks. Moreover, as we
found after 9/11, many of these regimes or elements within them
tolerate or occasionally encourage mainstream Islamists, many of
whom not only express anti-American, anti-Israeli, and even explicitly
anti-Semitic views but also oppose some of Washington’s most
forward looking policies, such as the very idea of a two state solution
to the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict. The question thus arises: Can or
should the United States do anything to help Arab governments and
oppositions exit the trap of liberalized authority?
What is To be Done?
If President Bush’s recent speeches on the subject of Middle
East democracy are to be taken at face value, it certainly appears
that his administration is fed up with business as usual. But on
the level of actual policy, there is a wide gap between Bush’s neoWilsonian rhetoric and the realpolitik logic that has guided our
Middle East democracy aid programs. After all, for nearly a decade
now, these programs, by design or default, have sustained rather
than undermined liberalized autocracy. The package of aid projects
the United States has promoted in Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria,
and Yemen―and which it is continuing to promote through its
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)―focus on the usual
suspects: strengthening civil society, promoting the participation
of women, giving technical advice to parliaments and parties, or
encouraging trade and market economic reform.12 While these are
12

worthy goals, the assumption that this largely bottom-up, “demand
side” approach eventually will compel regimes to undertake a
transition from liberalization to democracy is dubious. Because
demand side programs skirt the essential problem, which is the nature
of state ideologies and state power, by themselves they cannot help
reformers and opposition forces exit the circular path of liberalized
autocracy. Absent a supply side approach that promotes from above
constitutional and institutional reforms that empower legislatures
to represent, and opposition parties to mobilize, alternatives to both
the ofﬁcial ruling parties and to their Islamist opponents, American
aid policies might help improve the overall quality of political life,
but they are unlikely to promote actual democratization.
That said, in and of itself, such caution is not unwarranted. A sudden
or messy departure from a piecemeal, demand side approach could
carry with it risks that could outweigh the beneﬁts of maintaining
the status quo. The most obvious of these risks is a democratization
process that would hand the mantle of rule to Islamists. Faced with
the revolutionary prospect of Islamists in power, moderate Arab
reformers might be quickly out maneuvered by hard-line opponents
of all reform. The latter would push for a retreat to full autocracy
and, in so doing, polarize the political ﬁeld. Indeed, it is this very
prospect that helped sustain the political purgatory of liberalized
autocracy. The challenge for the administration is to devise some
way of assessing where and when the risks of a democratization
strategy are sufﬁciently low, such that it can be implemented without
reinforcing the position of Islamists and their hard-line opponents
in ruling regimes. As Samuel Huntington once put it, there is no
easy choice, and, it is worth adding, no easy yardstick by which we
can measure the costs and beneﬁts of political liberalization versus
democratization.
The most suitable candidate for a democratization strategy
would be an Arab state whose electoral system is already sufﬁciently
independent and competitive, such that, if and when Islamists do
enter a genuinely open election, they must face, negotiate, and
ultimately share power with non-Islamist parties. A multipolar
political arena that contains the challenge of Islamist parties is an
absolute necessity. Unfortunately, there are few candidates that
meet this criterion. As I have already noted, liberalized autocracy
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tends to beneﬁt Islamist parties, thus producing a zero-sum regimeopposition conﬂict that makes democratic compromise difﬁcult. For
this reason, the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain will
be very hesitant to embrace any kind of strategy that moves beyond
the limits of political liberalization.
The one Arab state whose leaders eventually might entertain such
a move is Morocco. While the credibility and legitimacy of Morocco’s
non-Islamist political parties has diminished over the last decade, the
two largest secular parties, as well as several other smaller parties,
command sufﬁcient public support such that no Islamist party could
hope to rule other than in a multi-party coalition. Moreover, as a
monarchy, Morocco enjoys a structural advantage that the Arab
world’s presidential systems lack: a leader who is not tied down by
one ruling party, and who thus can serve as an arbiter who brokers
compromises over social, cultural, legal, and economic policy.13 This
brokering function is formalized in a constitution that, despite its
democratic provisions, gives the king ultimate and supreme power
over the legislature and the cabinet―when and if he should choose
to use it. Such eclecticism gives the king the power to appoint cabinet
members regardless of whether or not they speak for political parties.
Any democratization strategy worth its salt would have to change
the provision through a constitutional reform that would clearly
require the formation of cabinets that represent elected majorities.
Moreover, this reform would have to provide, at the very least, for
the direct election of the upper house.
Would Morocco’s young king, Mohammed VI, be ready for such
a move? It is hard to know. Having inherited a constitution that
already was amended twice, there is ample precedent for him to help
his countrymen move beyond the limits of liberalized autocracy.
With bold leadership, and a readiness of all parties to cooperate
on the negotiation of a new democratic pact, such a move is not
inconceivable. Still, given the country’s huge income disparities and
the capacity of Morocco’s urban poor to mobilize, a democratization
strategy would entail considerable risks. King Mohammed alluded
to that very point when he stated, more than a little defensively, “that
each country has to have its own speciﬁc features of democracy”―an
implicit, if obvious, rationale for maintaining Morocco’s own brand
of liberalized autocracy.14
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Conclusion.
The Bush administration has not chosen the path of encouraging
democratization of liberalized autocracies. Rather than ﬁnd even one
Arab country that might be suitable for a genuine democratization
strategy, it has hitched all its hopes on a policy of military intervention
and regime change in Iraq. The guiding assumption here, it seems to
me, is that the eclectic legacy of semi-authoritarianism is so deeply
embedded in the social, economic, and political soil of the Arab world
that there can be no hope of genuine political reform unless one Arab
country is given the chance to demonstrate for the entire region how
to get it right from the very beginning. To put it in both political science
and medical terms, the administration believes that the scourge
of “path dependency” can only be removed by transplanting the
political heart of the region’s sickest patient: Iraq.
This assumption is as compelling as it is troubling. It is compelling
in the sense that, however sick the patient, Iraq has always suffered
from a malady that afﬂicts nearly all Arab states: a basic lack of
consensus over national identity. The divisions between Shi’a, Kurds,
and Sunnis in Iraq may be sharper than those between Berbers and
Arabs in Algeria or Morocco, or between secularists and Islamists
in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen; but the problem of how to pursue
democratization in societies divided by profound ideological, social,
or ethno-religious differences is present in every Arab state.15 As
noted earlier, this problem arises from the capacity of democracy to
reward one group repeatedly at the expense of others. When elections
reproduce the same winners and losers over time, the latter have
no rational reason to support democracy. Faced by the possibility
of their “democratic” exclusion, they will often prefer autocracy or
revolt over free elections.16
The solution to this “democracy dilemma” in Iraq was to
impose through violence, intimidation, and oil-ﬁnanced patronage
a particularly vicious form of full autocracy in the name of “Arab
nationalism.” In an interesting echo of Bolshevism, although this
ideology claimed to speak for the (Arab) “masses” or “people,” in
practice it was designed to defend or rationalize the particularistic
interests of the Sunni minority in general, and the Saddam Hussein
Tikrit-based super minority clan in particular. If the United States
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can, by force of arms, destroy this cynical system and replace it with a
successful experiment in democratic power sharing, one can readily
imagine that such a happy outcome might eventually inspire other
Arab leaders and their oppositions to negotiate democratic solutions
to identity conﬂicts. In this sense, the administration’s reasoning is
compelling, even if it rests on a political and military “experiment”
(to use Kanan Makiya’s own words) whose odds of success were at
best 50/50 when the United States and its partners embarked on the
Iraq campaign in March 2003.
Since then, the odds have gone down considerably, so much so
that the experiment in Iraq eventually may produce the very opposite
result intended by the United States: more rather than less autocracy
in the Arab world. This is why the Iraq gambit from the start was―at
least in the opinion of this author―even more troubling than it was
compelling. The chances of success always were small because, to
prevail over the long term, any credible power sharing arrangement
between Kurds, Shi’a, and Sunnis would have required―among other
things―a long-term political and especially military commitment
from the entire international community. As in Kosovo and BosniaHertsogravenia, the international community for the foreseeable
future would have to take on the state’s most important function:
maintaining a monopoly over the means of coercion. This was
especially true in Iraq, since it would be years, if not decades, before
any new Iraqi military or police force would have the nationalist
credibility and military discipline to resist the centrifugal forces of
ethno-religious conﬂicts that Saddam Hussein’s fall released. When
the United States chose to go it alone, it effectively gave up the crucial
symbolic and political umbrella it needed to transform what many
Iraqis viewed as an American-led invasion into an internationally
blessed and secured liberation. Thus many Iraqis―and not merely the
Sunnis―have come to view the current unhappy situation through
the lens of the “1920 Revolution,” when Shi’ites and Sunnis joined in
common cause against the British.
We can only hope that the current―and certainly belated―effort
to internationalize the Iraq gambit will reverse what appears to be
a growing Sunni-Shi’ite insurrection. But even if the United States
is lucky enough to contain the insurrection and secure a long-term
political and military commitment from the United Nations and/
16

or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to rebuild Iraq’s political
and military institutions, much damage has been done already in
Iraq, and in the wider region as well. The liberalized autocracies of
the Arab world always had a distinctive solution to the dilemma of
political reform in divided societies. Rather than opt for either full
democracy or full autocracy, they have promoted experiments in
state-managed power sharing that have endured precisely because
ultimate power rests in the hands of the state. As we have already
noted, in Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, and Jordan, liberalized autocracy
allows for a kind of peaceful coexistence in parliaments whose lack
of authority is, paradoxically, the precondition of social peace: So
long as no one group actually wins or loses―or actually wields real
power on behalf of elected majorities―the system can totter along.
Viewing the chaos in Iraq, many Arab leaders, from both regimes
and oppositions, probably will conclude that trying to ﬁx this novel,
if ﬂawed, system is foolish. In societies where traditional values
and norms remain strong, a preference for the supposed comforts
of stability may once again prevail, eclipsing the few noble and
courageous voices who have dared clamor for democracy.
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